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n discussions of philosophical naturalism, the naturalist 
thesis— that everything there is is a natural object— is 
frequently assumed rather than argued for. Many philos-
ophers take it for granted that naturalism is right, and 
thus occupy themselves with showing how it is possible. 
 Before going any further, I must first make it clear that, 
by naturalism, I mean the restrictive naturalism, or physicalism, 
of philosophers such as David Papineau, Jaegwon Kim, Fred 
Dretske, et cetera. In fact, I will henceforth refer to this form of 
naturalism as physicalism in order to discourage conflation with 
'expansive naturalism' (held by, perhaps, such philosophers as 
Ludwig Wittgenstein, John McDowell, Donald Davidson, and so 
on— this list is contentious). 
 The claim that naturalism/physicalism is generally as-
sumed may seem absurd since there are, after all, volumes of con-
temporary literature on it. But what I mean is this: most of the 
arguments that purport to be arguments for physicalism are re-
ductions that show physicalism is possible. For example, a philo-
sophical physicalist might show how mental states can be re-
duced to physical states or show how talk of numbers can in 
principle be reduced to talk of physical phenomena. What these 
arguments assume is that physicalism follows from a reduction 
that shows its possibility, or that, in other words, once physical-
ism is shown to be non-contradictory, it follows necessarily. But 
of course that something is possible does not mean it is actual. 
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One may well concede to the physicalist the possibility of certain 
of his reductions and yet ask why one should take things to actu-
ally be this way. 
 Given the popularity of the physicalist thesis, the paucity 
of truly positive arguments for it is surprising. I suspect this lack 
has something to do with the intuitive appeal of physicalism (a 
modern phenomenon), but I will not dwell on the psychological 
appeal of physicalism.1 David Papineau, at least, offers an argu-
ment for the actuality of physicalism in his seminal book Philo-
sophical Naturalism. Let’s examine it. 
 Papineau thinks that the (forthcoming) completeness of 
physics supports two positions: supervenience and token con-
gruence. The conjunction of these positions is supposed to estab-
lish physicalism. Either position taken on its own fails to do so.2 
Papineau writes "supervenience and token congruence are to-
gether sufficient for physicalism"3 (my emphasis). I understand 
Papineau to regard the relation of the conjunction of superveni-
ence and token congruence to physicalism as analytic. Physical-
ism, as Papineau means it, simply is supervenience and token 
congruence. So, if we establish both supervenience and token 
congruence, there is no further question as to whether physical-
ism, too, is correct; that physicalism is correct would follow 
simply by virtue of the logical relations of these words. This al-
lows a systematic division of the claims of physicalism. Each 
conjunct can be evaluated on its own.4 
 Why should supervenience and token congruence (and 
thus physicalism) be accepted? Papineau writes, "both superven-
ience and token congruence are strongly supported by an im-
portant feature of science, namely the internal completeness of 
physics."5 In other words, there is (at least) one argument (broadly 
understood) that supports both of these conjuncts. Thus 
Papineau's overall argument for physicalism from the complete-
ness of physics has this form:  
 (1) The completeness of physics (C) is true. 
 (2) If C is true, then supervenience (S) is true. 
 (3) If C is true, then token congruence (T) is true. 
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 (4) If S and C are true, then physicalism (P) is true. 
 (5) Since S and C are true by the first three premises, P is 
true by the fourth  premise. 
 The structure of this essay reflects the shape of 
Papineau's argument: first, an elucidation of what is meant by 
'the completeness of physics'; second, an examination of whether 
the completeness of physics entails supervenience; lastly, a close 
look at token congruence and whether it follows from the com-
pleteness of physics. As I have already said, I will follow 
Papineau's lead and consider (4) to be analytic. So if the first 
three premises are correct, then Papineau's conclusion of physi-
calism follows as a matter of course. 
 What does Papineau mean by 'the completeness of phys-
ics'? In explaining this notion, Papineau is duly careful not to 
build his physicalist conclusion into his definition. One might be 
tempted to hear 'the completeness of physics' as simply the idea 
that whatever there is, it is explained by physics, i.e. a mere rework-
ing of the physicalist thesis. If one meant to ground claims of 
physicalism in the completeness of physics understood in this 
sense, he would find himself arguing in a circle.  
Papineau, however, does not make this mistake. He 
writes that physics is complete "in the sense that all physical 
events are determined, or have their chances determined, by pri-
or physical events according to physical laws."6 In other words, 
whatever is described as a physical event can be sufficiently ex-
plained in physical terms, a claim which does not (yet) deny that 
there might also be non-physical events. So, if a billiard ball (qua 
physical object) rolls across a table (qua physical event), we need 
not revert to any non-physical explanation in order to under-
stand what is (physically) taking place. We are able to describe 
the movement of the billiard ball entirely in terms of physical 
causes, and explanations on the order of, say, my intentions in 
playing a game of billiards are superfluous to the understanding 
of the physical events taking place on the billiard table. 
 The completeness of physics is the claim that physics is a 
closed system of explanation, and in asserting (or assuming) the 
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completeness of physics, one need not deny that there are, 
roughly speaking, other things in the world. Neither does the com-
pleteness of physics obviously or immediately entail that these 
other things must, in some way or another, be reducible to phys-
ics. Further philosophical work is required in order for one to 
see how physicalism might follow from the completeness of 
physics. The completeness of physics is merely the thesis that 
physical causes exhaustively determine physical events. 
 The completeness of physics is supposed to support su-
pervenience. Papineau puts forward two premises that entail 
this conclusion. The first premise is that two identical physical 
states issue in the same consequences (or chances thereof).7 The 
second premise is that different 'mental states' must have the po-
tential to manifest themselves in at least some 'physical con-
texts'.8 In other words, if there exists some mental state, it must 
be the kind of thing that could in theory be physically detected 
under the right circumstances. (It is a truism that, if something 
can be physically manifested, it can be physically detected.) This 
could be through behavior but does not need be so; differing 
neurophysiological brain-states would suffice. In other words, 
mental states are manifested in physical states by necessarily is-
suing in physical consequences (or chances thereof), and thus a 
difference in mental state could not exist without a correlative 
difference in physical state (i.e. a difference in the actual conse-
quences or a difference in the chances of certain consequences fol-
lowing). 
 These two premises entail supervenience. The first prem-
ise tells us that physical states lead to consequent physical states 
(which lead to further consequent physical states, and so on) 
with necessity, and so there is no 'room' for other, non-physical, 
causes for what occurs in a physical-causal chain of events. If a 
non-physical cause exists in such a chain, it occupies the same 
'space' as some physical cause already in play. That is, if any oth-
er, non-physical, cause exists, it is strictly coincidental with cer-
tain of the physical causes that issue in the consequent physical 
states. A non-physical cause would be unable to cause any diver-
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gence in the physical-causal chain. The second premise tells us 
that mental states are manifested in these physical states so that a 
change in a mental state necessarily has a correlate change in a 
physical state. In other words, mental states do cause physical 
events. Thus there is a 'strict coincidence' between mental and 
physical states; and this 'strict coincidence' is the same phenome-
non as supervenience. If two systems are exactly the same physi-
cally, they must also be exactly the same mentally since, if there is 
a mental difference between the two systems, there must also be 
a physical difference between the two systems. But since by hy-
pothesis the two systems are physically identical, we have ruled 
out the possibility of two physically identical systems having 
non-identical mental phenomena. 
 I find Papineau's move from the completeness of physics 
to supervenience merely plausible because, while the conclusion 
surely follows from the premises, I see no iron-clad argument for 
accepting the second premise (the 'manifestability of the mental' 
premise). Indeed Papineau too admits merely the plausibility of 
this premise. He writes that his defense of it "and hence of super-
venience, is less than fully principled."9 The vulnerability of this 
premise lies in the felicity of the counter-supposition that there 
are mental states that have no physical manifestation. There is, at 
least, no obvious logical incoherence in such a supposition. 
 Papineau thinks that the state of affairs that would war-
rant a rejection of the second premise is exceedingly implausible. 
Papineau writes that, if there were a mental state that had no po-
tential for physical manifestation, then it would be 
"undetectable"10— and who would wish to suppose there to be 
such things as 'undetectable mental states'? And if we suppose 
'undetectable mental states', why not 'undetectable leprechauns' 
sitting on your shoulder? If such exist, it is a very weak sense of 
'exist' that is in play here. So this line of thought has some intui-
tive appeal. What must be added, though, is that Papineau is 
talking about physical detectability. However, this is not to say 
that one could not detect such a mental state in some other way. 
Suppose one detects these mental states mentally! And to say 
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that 'mental detection' is something that must itself be physically 
manifestable is to beg the question. 
 I have had thoughts, feelings, and so forth—'mental 
states', if you will— that neither led to physical action nor would 
have under any circumstances (nor did my 'detection', or aware-
ness, of these mental states lead to any potential for different 
physical action— at least as far as I know).11 Papineau's recourse 
to such a thought must be to say that such mental states must 
have strictly coincidental physical states (perhaps confined to 
the brain), but this is to argue in a circle. The very question is 
whether or not such things must have physical manifestability 
(either in the brain or elsewhere), and there is no obvious reason 
to suppose such mental states must be physically manifestable. 
No reason, that is, except for the thesis of physicalism itself, but 
this is the very claim at stake. When Papineau writes that sup-
posing non-physically-manifestable mental states "[flies] in the 
face of empirical findings,"12 he is lapsing into the assumption of 
physicalism and failing to actually argue for it. Mental states that 
have no physical manifestation are, by hypothesis, not the sorts 
of things that empirical findings speak for or against, and so in a 
debate over their existence, empirical findings are irrelevant. No 
matter how many times an empirical (physical) test fails to re-
turn evidence of a non-physical object, the likelihood of that non
-physical object's existence remains unaffected. No empirical 
finding could confirm either the existence or non-existence of 
such an object, and this goes for non-physically-manifestable 
mental states. When Papineau says that supposing the existence 
of such objects flies in the face of empirical findings, Papineau is 
himself making a claim that flies in the face of what can be 
soundly inferred from empirical findings. 
 Having said all that, I still find supervenience a plausible 
claim. That is to say, my intuitions (and no more) are in sympa-
thy with supervenience, though I think Papineau's defense of it 
is even less principled than he realizes. Yet, setting aside the 
question of supervenience, it remains to be asked whether the 
completeness of physics supports the other half of the conjunc-
The Completeness of Physics 
31 
tion that is physicalism: token congruence. To this question, the 
answer is no (and for what it is worth this time the assertion goes 
unredeemed by any sympathetic intuitions held by the author of 
this essay). 
 First, it is necessary to get into view what exactly 'token 
congruence' means. What must be true for a claim of token con-
gruence to obtain? Papineau writes, "To get physicalism proper 
we need to require... that the mental is in some sense the same 
substance as the physical, so as to rule out doctrines like epiphe-
nomenalism."13 So in order for "physicalism proper" to obtain, 
one needs to augment supervenience with the claim that "the 
mental is in some sense the same substance as the physical." This 
is a rather murky remark. What it means to count "in some 
sense" as the same substance must be settled, and it is incumbent 
on the physicalist to do this without abusing the in-some-sense 
clause to the point of rendering his claim trivial. 
 Let's look at what token congruence is not. Papineau is 
concerned to distinguish physicalism from epiphenomenalism, 
and he suggests establishing token congruence does just this. He 
writes, "supervenience isn't physicalism, for it leaves open the 
possibility of epiphenomenalism."14 Thus whatever epiphenome-
nalism claims, token congruence is supposed to in some way 
claim the opposite. Epiphenomenalism is roughly the claim that, 
while supervenient, the mental and the physical are, in some im-
portant sense, distinct, or 'not the same substance.' That is, while 
there exists strict coincidence between the mental and the physi-
cal, they are, again in some sense, two different things. Papineau 
writes "In order to ensure physicalism, we need to require in ad-
dition that mental phenomena do not just co-vary with physical 
phenomena [as claims the epiphenomenalist], but are in some 
sense congruent with them."15 Papineau thinks mental phenome-
na do more than just co-vary with physical phenomena, and the 
epiphenomenalist that they merely do. 
 The phrase 'in some sense' has by now been repeated sev-
eral times. My intention in doing this has been to bring out that 
everything hinges on the exact sense in which Papineau means 
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to claim the mental and the physical are the same. So then let's 
ask it: in exactly what sense are the mental and the physical tied 
more closely than mere co-variance? Papineau writes that "the 
mental is ontologically inseparable from the physical,"16 and this 
seems to be the 'sense' in which the mental and the physical are 
the same substance. This is still a rather murky remark. To elabo-
rate further: since it is, Papineau thinks, clearly wrong to say, 
"Your arm would have gone up even if you did not want it to," 
and also wrong to say, "Your arm would have gone up even if 
such-and-such physical events (in your brain, shoulder, et cetera) 
had not happened," we have here a strict coincidence between 
wanting one's arm to go up and the relevant neurophysiological 
occurrences. Taken in conjunction with Papineau's belief that, 
since the mental can be rightly said to cause the physical (just as 
the physical can be rightly said to cause the physical), it would 
imply "an absurd proliferation of causal overdetermination" 
were the mental and the physical not to be the same substance 
(at least in some sense). In other words, it is the sheer implausi-
bility of such overdetermination that causes Papineau to rule out 
the 'ontological separability' of the mental and the physical. It is 
so implausible to suppose that there are two causes here that the 
physical cause and the mental cause must be the same cause, 
and thus they are 'ontologically inseparable.' 
 Granting Papineau that overdetermination both appears 
to occur and yet would be so absurd that we should deny it and 
claim instead that the mental and the physical are in some sense 
the same substance,17 we should ask why Papineau takes his ar-
gument to prove physicalism and not 'mentalism.' Even if we are 
convinced by Papineau that his argument for token congruence 
proves the mental and the physical to be, in some sense, the 
same thing, it is still necessary to explain the priority given to the 
physical side of the equation. Couldn't this argument support 
just as well some form of idealism in which everything is reduci-
ble to the mental? Why claim that this argument shows the men-
tal to collapse into the physical instead of that it shows things to 
be the other way around? 
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 In a footnote, Papineau touches on these thoughts and 
gives his answer in terms of the completeness of physics. He 
writes, "Why doesn't this argument work in reverse, and also 
show that all physical differences must depend on mental differ-
ences?"18 The completeness of physics, Papineau thinks, provides 
an answer to this question; he writes, "The essential reason is 
that the mental is not complete."19 To unpack why this is a reason 
(indeed the essential one): every physical state can be completely 
explained by antecedent physical causes. A mental state, on the 
other hand, is something that may sometimes be completely ex-
plained by antecedent mental states and sometimes not. Thus 
priority is granted to the physical because it has no need of non-
physical explanation whereas the mental seems as though it 
must sometimes either go unexplained or be explained by some-
thing outside the realm of the mental. Though the move from ob-
serving that physics is a closed system of explanation to claiming 
its ontological priority may seem like an absurd non-sequitur, let's 
set that objection aside. At the very least, if it is true that physics 
constitutes a closed system while the mental realm does not, 
there is something particularly interesting about physics 
(though, again, why this specialness should lead Papineau to 
claim ontological priority for physics may yet be opaque). 
 That physics is unique in its forthcoming completeness is 
something that I think should be questioned, but to do so, it is 
necessary to switch registers slightly and juxtapose the physical, 
not to the mental, but to the special (as in the 'special sciences', in 
which the study of the mental is included).20 Papineau— as well 
as all other philosophical physicalists— is arguing as much 
against the special sciences in general as he is against the men-
tal,21 and it is because of its completeness that he picks outs 
physics as special amongst the sciences. So, is Papineau right 
that physical is special in a way the special sciences are not? 
 The special sciences are as potentially complete as the 
physical sciences. If we allow a conjunction of the various 
branches of the special sciences, I take it that we may well give a 
complete account of every 'special' state in terms of antecedent 
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special states. For example, we explain the freak cyclone in terms 
of the flapping of a butterfly's wing without jumping sciences as 
long as we consider meteorology and biology to be continuous 
with each other. We could say that combining our knowledge of 
meteorology with biology in this way deepens our understand-
ing of both sub-sciences; knowing the effect a butterfly can have 
on storms and vice versa can be understood under the holistic 
heading of 'bio-meteorology.' Once we combine biology, meteor-
ology, cosmology, psychology, and so forth, I see no barrier to 
giving a full description and causal explanation of all special 
states in special terms. We might call this 'the completeness of 
the special.'22 Given these considerations, I see no reason to not 
reverse Papineau's professed intuition "that chemical phenome-
na... are all at bottom physical... What is more, I am inclined to 
think the same about the phenomena studied by meteorology, 
biology, psychology, sociology and the other so-called 'special 
sciences.'"23 One might equally say, "I am inclined to think gravi-
ty, particles, mass, and so on— in sum, all aspects of the so-
called 'physical sciences'— are all at bottom special." 
 To raise and respond to a few objections to my sugges-
tion that this way of looking at the special sciences really is anal-
ogous to Papineau's conception of physics: first, why should we 
allow a conjunction of sciences to be called 'a' science? After all, 
it is the completeness of physics that is appealing, and the way I 
have described special science makes it seem no more than a 
hodge-podge of different fields thrown together after the fact. 
My response is that combining, say, biology and meteorology, is 
simply broadening our understanding of what there is and how it 
relates to what else there is. That is physics' prime directive too 
(plus, it would seem, a few considerations about minimizing its 
ontology). Combining the forces 'electricity' and 'magnetism' in-
to 'electromagnetism' was a great achievement for physical sci-
ence, and congruently, to recognize the interconnectedness of 
butterflies and cyclones is to deepen our understanding of both 
butterflies and cyclones.24 
 One might next object that we will never have sufficient 
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special science to account for all cases of special events and ob-
jects. There are two sorts of answers to this objection. First, I 
point out that special science and physics are in the same boat in 
this regard. Neither physical science nor special science as it cur-
rently stands offers us a complete explanation of their respective 
fields, and based on observation of how these sciences have de-
veloped so far, it seems likely that our current categories and ex-
planations will necessarily undergo some revision as we move 
forward toward greater overall understanding. Thus this objec-
tion might equally be made against the completeness of physics. 
Second, I take Papineau's cue and suggest that we simply define 
'special science' as the science of whatever categories are ulti-
mately needed to give full explanations for all special effects 
(echoing Papineau's definition of physics: "the science of whatev-
er categories are needed to give full explanations for all physical 
effects"25). In fact, special science might be uniquely open to in-
troducing theology into the fold if it turns out to be a requisite 
category of explanation, and in this way, special science may be 
able to take in stride the idea that the universe requires a neces-
sary cause, or that there must be an unmoved mover, et cetera 
(things which may pose a legitimate explanatory problem for the 
thesis of the completeness of physics if the category 'physics' is 
not to be expanded to the point of being unrecognizable as such). 
 Finally, one might worry that, since there clearly are phys-
ical phenomena, even the most chauvinistic special scientist can-
not claim that everything is at bottom a special object. Of course, 
this chauvinistic special scientist— mirroring his chauvinistic 
physical scientist counterpart— will claim that discourse on 
'physical objects' is simply a way of talking about special objects, 
that such talk is in principle reducible to talk of special objects. 
 Thus the priority of physics is lacking in Papineau's ac-
count (even assuming ontological priority follows from complete-
ness) since it is not unique in its potential completeness. Until 
some other distinguishing attribute of physics is suggested and 
defended, we could just as well be 'specialists' as 'physicalists' 
since Papineau's argument for token congruence supports the 
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conclusion that everything is at bottom physical no more than it 
supports the conclusion that everything is at bottom special. If 
these are contradictory theses, then there is surely something 
wrong with Papineau's argument. 
 Papineau seems to think that being able to offer some 
sort of physical description of every event means that there is 
only physics (even if this description seems to leave out im-
portant aspects of an event). But we could put everything in spe-
cial terms, and we might then equally argue that everything is 
special and that the physical supervenes on the special instead of 
the other way around. Clearly both of these views fail to get 
things right. It is the notion that we must decide between these 
two positions that is confused. Like a coin (or better an n-sided 
die), a complete account of what there is must account for multi-
ple interlocking, yet distinct and irreducible, aspects of reality. 
We could define the whole of a coin in terms of its relation to its 
'heads' side, and equally so for 'tails' (or, again, the whole of an n
-sided die might be described in terms relative to one of its fac-
es). However, such descriptions leave out an important perspec-
tive on, or way of understanding and explaining, the object in 
question. That a mode of description is, or may be, complete 
grants it no ontological priority. 
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Notes 
1. See Bilgrami (2010) for a brilliant genealogy of naturalism. 
2. At first pass, these positions seem to have this relationship to 
each other: supervenience does not entail token congruence, but 
token congruence requires that supervenience be true. So per-
haps one should say that establishing token congruence estab-
lishes physicalism, but if this is so, it is because token congru-
ence entails supervenience. 
3. Papineau, Philosophical Naturalism, p. 12. 
4. One might still ask whether it makes sense to call the conjunc-
tion of supervenience and token congruence 'physicalism', but 
for the purposes of this essay, this question is not of interest. 
5. Ibid., p. 13. 
6. Ibid., p. 16. 
7. Ibid., p. 17. 
8. Ibid., pp. 17-18. 
9. Ibid., p. 20. 
10. Ibid., p. 20. 
11. Of course, I'm writing about these mental states now so, clear-
ly, they have manifested themselves! - Well, suppose I speak this 
way because of a mistaken belief that these mental states could 
not be physically manifested. Might not what I'm saying still ap-
ply to yet other mental states, ones that I would not even men-
tion in this oblique way? And perhaps what I say here is true of 
other people's mental states. Their mental states may remain ut-
terly private while I, by luck or insight, happen to describe them 
here in this essay. 
12. Ibid., p. 20. 
13. Ibid., p. 11. 
14. Ibid., p. 21. 
15. Ibid., p. 21. 
16. Ibid., p. 23. 
17. This essay is primarily about the relationship between the 
completeness of physics and Papineau's argument for physical-
ism, but I find myself unable to resist adding a digressive foot-
note at this point. So, a digression: I think there is an equivoca-
tion of the word 'cause' as used in 'mental cause' and 'physical 
cause' and that this equivocation makes the "absurd prolifera-
tion" of causes identified by Papineau seem woefully unabsurd. 
When we say "My arm went up because I wanted it to" and "My 
arm went up because such-and-such neurons fired in my brain", 
there is simply something different meant by each 'because'. In 
the first sentence, I am perhaps distinguishing an intentional ac-
tion from a non-intentional one, and in the second, I am, by hy-
pothesis, offering an explanation of a physical state based on an 
antecedent physical cause. Why this form of overdetermination - 
if we can still call it that - is supposed to strike anyone as absurd 
is beyond me. If all such events are 'overdetermined', they are 
not overdetermined in virtue of having multiple causes of the 
same kind but rather in virtue of having multiple causes of dif-
ferent kinds - Aristotle, for example, had such a view of causa-
tion - and depending on the discussion at hand, we may speak of 
different kinds of cause as the different senses become appropri-
ate. And this seems tantamount to saying that the same event can 
be described in multiple ways. The claim is now closer to plati-
tude than absurdity, and it is hard to imagine how it could moti-
vate anyone to claim different causes of the same event must re-
ally be the same cause. 
18. Ibid., p. 18. 
19. Ibid., p. 18. 
20. The special sciences comprise basically every field of science 
that is not physics. Psychology, meteorology, lepidoptology, ge-
ology, chemistry, anthropology, and many others are examples 
of special sciences. 
21. The change in registers from 'physical v. special' to 'physical 
v. mental' occurs on pp. 10 - 11 of Papineau's Philosophical Natu-
ralism. 
22. In fact, I don't think it is even necessary to conjoin the various 
special sciences. If we chose to do so, we could create a closed 
system of explanation for, say, weather as long as we make suffi-
cient use of the 'or chances thereof' clause that Papineau uses in 
his description of physics. We might say, "Here is how weather 
behaves usually. It is governed by causal relationships, though 
The Completeness of Physics 38 
Elek Lane 39 
there are times when weather-events just happen. However, we 
have models for these 'random' cases that do a good job of pre-
dicting the likelihood of such things. So we can define the com-
pleteness of meteorology like this: two meteorological states will 
issue in the same consequent meteorological states or chances 
thereof". 
23. Ibid., p. 9. 
24. One might continue objecting on a similar note: physics puts 
things in terms that are utterly simple (e.g. atoms, or maybe fer-
mions and bosons) whereas the objects of special science are 
composites (e.g. storms composed of wind and rain, butterflies 
that have complicated life cycles, yellow rubber ducks that are 
complexes of 'yellow', 'rubber' and 'duck', and so on). It is true 
that the objects of special science may all be viewed as composite 
concepts given the right schema, but this is also true of 'basic' 
physical objects (which are understood in terms of mass, spin, 
and so forth). The idea of an atom is as conceptually rich as the 
idea of a butterfly or a storm. The simplicity that physics claims 
seems to be that of a minimal ontology. But what counts as sim-
ple is relative, and there are considerations of simplicity in 
which the special sciences will emerge as simpler than physics. 
But no more of this here. 
25. Ibid., pp. 29-30.  
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